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THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 
NATIONAL ABORTION LAWS 
Kelsey Zorzi+ 
In 2000, the United Nations (UN) entity that monitors Member States’ 
compliance with the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women—the Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—lodged an official 
complaint against Luxembourg, claiming that its abortion laws “appear 
anachronistic,” and its government “appears to lack the commitment to review 
and adapt [abortion] legislation to changing attitudes and developments in the 
European region.”1  The abortion laws of Luxembourg were not, at the time, out 
of step with international law, which does not require States to legalize abortion.2  
Luxembourg already allowed abortion in many circumstances, including 
whenever a physician determined that a pregnancy threatened a woman’s life or 
health, in cases of rape, incest, or fetal impairment, and even simply for social 
or economic reasons.3  Yet, because Luxembourg did not permit on-demand 
abortion, it was subject to censure by a United Nations body.4 
                                                 
 + Kelsey Zorzi  serves as U.N. counsel with ADF International.  She represents ADF International 
at the United Nations by providing U.N. Member State representatives with key legal resources and 
language amendments that promote religious freedom and the inherent value and dignity of every 
person.  Zorzi earned her J.D. at George Washington University Law School in 2013, where she 
participated in the GW-Oxford International Human Rights Law Program and won first place in 
the 2013 National Religious Freedom Moot Court Competition.  Prior to graduating from law 
school, Zorzi interned with the U.S. Department of Justice and the International Centre for Missing 
& Exploited Children.  Zorzi is admitted to the state bars in New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut. 
 1. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on its Twenty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/55/38, ¶ 406 (June 30, 2000), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ 
cedaw/reports/a5538.pdf [hereinafter “Rep. of CEDAW: Luxembourg 2000”].  This was not the 
first time CEDAW pressured Luxembourg to liberalize its abortion laws; for example, the 
Committee noted in its 1997 report that it was “deeply concerned at the existing legislation on 
abortion” in Luxembourg because it “penalized women.”  U.N.  Concluding Comments of the 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at ¶ 210 (June 25, 1997), http:// 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cedaw/cedaw-luxembourg.htm [hereinafter “Concluding Comments of 
CEDAW: Luxembourg 1997”]. 
 2. See U.N. Population Div., Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Major Dimensions of Abortion 
Policy Part II.B.1 (2002), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/ (discussing 
how abortion laws are governed by State legislation, and no international standard yet exists). 
 3. De l’avortement [Abortion] [Penal Code] tit. VII, ch. 1, art. 353 (Nov. 15, 1978) (Lux.), 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/abortion/LUXEMBOURG.abo.htm. 
 4. See Rep. of CEDAW: Luxembourg 2000, supra note 1, ¶ 406. 
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This censure had no basis in international law, but its insubstantial legal 
grounding did not prevent it from being ultimately effective.5  In 2012, 
Luxembourg legalized abortion on-demand, and admitted that the change was 
partially made to ensure it was in step with the laws of other European countries.6  
Prior to taking this step, however, Luxembourg joined the now-widespread 
practice of pressuring Latin American nations to change their abortion laws 
through the UN’s Universal Periodic Review.7  In 2010, during the seventh 
session of the Universal Periodic Review, Luxembourg recommended that El 
Salvador “[i]nitiate a national dialogue on the right of women to reproductive 
health, including with respect to the consequences of restrictive laws on 
abortion, including the criminalization of abortion.”8 
This brief history of the UN’s interaction with Luxembourg illustrates a trend 
that deserves significantly more attention than it has received.  Working beyond 
its mandate and outside the scope of international law, the UN, through its 
various organs and bodies, has developed a complex, energetic, and potent 
system to pressure States to adopt certain domestic abortion laws.9  There is 
evidence that the UN’s fervent advocacy for abortion has contributed to 
changing abortion laws, despite the fact that the life of the unborn child is 
protected under international law.10 
                                                 
 5. See Hillary White, Luxembourg Legalises Abortion on Demand, LIFESITE (Nov. 23, 2012, 
1:34 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/luxembourg-legalises-abortion-on-demand. 
 6. See Charline Lebrun, Restrictions on Abortion in Luxembourg To Be Relaxed, 
LUXEMBURGER WORT (Nov. 23, 2012, 7:39 AM), http://www.wort.lu/en/luxembourg/restrictions-
on-abortion-in-luxembourg-to-be-relaxed-50af1938e4b0246412999677; White, supra note 5.  In 
2014, the government of Luxembourg liberalized abortion law to an even greater extent by 
removing the requirements that women undergo a second consultation with a medical doctor and 
show they are under distress because of their pregnancy.  See Luxembourg Decriminalises 
Abortion, GÈNÉTHIQUE (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.genethique.org/en/content/luxembourg-
decriminalises-abortion#.VpPobJMrKA8.  In practice, however, the requirement of showing 
distress never prevented a woman from obtaining an abortion.  See id. 
 7. See Luxembourg Recommendation to El Salvador, http://www.upr-info.org/database/ (in 
the drop down menus, select “El Salvador” for State Under Review, “Luxembourg” for 
Recommending State, “Women’s Rights” for Issue, “1st Cycle” for Cycle, and “Recommendations 
and Voluntary Pledges” for Recommendations & Voluntary Pledges; then click on Go; the source 
is the third result). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Press Release, Irish Family Planning Assoc., Government Under Pressure at the UN 
re Implementation of Abortion Ruling (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.ifpa.ie/news/irish-government 
-under-pressure-at-un; Stefano Gennarini, Nigeria Refuses To Give in to UN Pressure on Abortion, 
‘Sexual Rights’, LIFESITE (Sep. 19, 2015, 2:39 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/unfpa- 
foiled-by-nigeria-on-abortion-sexual-rights; Rebecca Oas, UN Human Rights System Becomes Pro-
Abortion Echo Chamber, C-FAM (Nov. 26, 2014), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/un-human-rights-
system-becomes-pro-abortion-echo-chamber/. 
 10. Various international instruments recognize the right to life of the unborn child.  For 
example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly states, “the child, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth.”  G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Preamble, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989), http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-declaration/.  In 
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While both legislators and judges have cited international treaties as having 
informed their decisions, the story of the influence of international law on 
domestic abortion laws is primarily one of the growing influence of soft law 
produced in and through UN bodies.11  Because no international treaty refers to 
a right to abortion, UN actors interested in promoting access to abortion have 
increasingly relied on a particular interpretation of the relationship between soft 
law and customary international law.12  Some now argue that it is possible for 
customary international law to develop out of a series of soft law documents.13  
                                                 
addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the death penalty for 
pregnant women, which is intended to protect the right of the life of the unborn.  See G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI) art. 6, § 5, International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (Mar. 23, 1976), 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm.  As the draft of the International Covenants 
on Human Rights states: “The principal reason for providing in paragraph 4 of the original text that 
the death sentence should not be carried out on pregnant women was to save the life of an innocent 
unborn child.”  G.A. Rep. of the Third Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3764 (Dec. 6, 1957) 
(emphasis added). 
 11. See Stefano Gennarini, Court in Argentina Cites UN ‘Experts’ To Establish ‘Right’ to 
Abortion, LIFESITE (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/court-in-argentina-cites-un-
experts-to-establish-right-to-abortion. 
 12. Id.  Customary international law—the norms that have evolved over time in the 
international system, such as norms about the treatment of ambassadors—are understood to be the 
only binding international law other than treaties.  See Richard G. Wilkins & Jacob Reynolds, 
International Law and the Right to Life, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 128‒30 (2006). 
 13. Historically, international law was limited in scope, but attempts to reshape international 
law are best understood in the context of the recent worldwide shift regarding the relationship 
between international and domestic law.  Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 125‒28.  The core 
of international law is comprised of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia, outlining the 
relationships between nations regarding war, commerce, and boundary disputes.  Id. at 127.  Today, 
treaty law has expanded to “deal not only with the obligations of nations, but also with the rights 
of individuals.”  Id.  Wilkins and Reynolds correctly identify the three most significant elements 
contributing to the increasing prominence of international law: (1) the expanding scope of 
international treaties; (2) the increasing rate at which the UN produces soft law norms; and (3) the 
increasing willingness of national actors to consult or even defer to international law.  Id. at 128‒
29, 131.  For example, although Article VI, Clause ii, of the U.S. Constitution states, “all Treaties 
made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” in 2005 a U.S. Supreme Court decision cited a 
treaty never ratified by the Senate to support its constitutionality determination.  See Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (referencing the UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child); 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Domestic political actors in many nations are showing increased 
readiness to ascribe authority to soft law documents produced through UN negotiations, especially 
those surrounding the reviews of major UN conferences.  Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 
128‒29.  Another example from the U.S. Supreme Court—the decision in Lawrence v. Texas to 
reverse an earlier Supreme Court decision—was partially justified by appeal to statements of 
international tribunals.  539 U.S. 558, 572‒73 (2003).  As Wilkins and Reynolds point out, “[p]rior 
to their citation by the nation’s highest court, these materials would have been considered by most 
constitutional scholars as among the ‘softest’ of all possible soft law.”  Wilkins & Reynolds, supra 
note 12, at 133.  Although, the United States is not alone in its willingness to view international 
law as normative, the United States has shown itself to be less ready than many other nations to 
accede to international norms and pressures.  See id. at 154.  Around the globe, the relationship 
between the individual and the State is now carried out against the backdrop of the norms formed 
through discussions of international law.  See id. at 127, 131, 133. 
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In accordance with this reasoning, the UN has pressured numerous States to 
enact more permissive abortion laws via consensus resolutions that emerge from 
UN conferences, the recommendations and quasi-judicial functions of the Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies (TMBs), and the Human Rights Council’s Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR), all of which are non-binding.14  Considering the 
statements national legislatures and courts make regarding their motives for 
liberalizing their abortion laws, it is clear that the UN holds significant influence 
in the realm of domestic abortion laws. 
Because this Essay seeks to establish a causal connection between the effects 
of UN activities and State abortion laws, the inherent problem of endogeneity 
must be addressed.  UN initiatives, the independent variable, will be analyzed 
relative to changes in domestic abortion laws, the dependent variable.  There is 
reason to believe that endogeneity may arise between these two variables due to 
a causality loop.  Specifically, it may be that changing domestic laws lead to 
greater UN initiatives, while greater UN initiatives also lead to changing 
domestic laws.15  If such a causality loop does exist, determining the direction 
of causality in any given instance will be extraordinarily complex.  There may 
be a second reason for endogeneity.  A third variable may be responsible for 
causing both the independent and dependent variables: changing global 
attitudes.16  This is to say that changing global attitudes may cause both UN 
initiatives and domestic abortion laws to change simultaneously.17  Because the 
UN is a forum for the expression of global attitudes, there is no infallible way to 
differentiate the impact of global attitudes from the impact of UN initiatives.18  
Given the extreme complexity of global politics, it is easy to be daunted by these 
issues, which may contribute to the dearth of research attempting to assess the 
UN’s impact on social laws.19  Nevertheless, the major assumption in this Essay 
is that political actors’ reports about their own motivations are relatively 
trustworthy.  If this assumption is correct, then there is a high probability of at 
                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Gennarini, supra note 9; Wendy Wright, Human Rights Watch Pressures 
Ecuador To Legalize Abortion, Pro-Life Nation Fights Back, LIFENEWS (Apr. 29, 2015), http:// 
www.lifenews.com/2015/04/29/human-rights-watch-pressures-ecuador-to-legalize-abortion-pro-
life-nation-fights-back/; Countries Urge El Salvador To Change Repressive Abortion Laws, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/countries-urge-
el-salvador-change-repressive-abortion-laws/. 
 15. See, e.g., supra notes 1‒10 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on the Status of Women, Statement Submitted by 
Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2015/NGO/191 (2015), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.6/2015/NGO/191. 
 17. See, e.g., supra notes 6‒8 and accompanying text. 
 18. See generally Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 16. 
 19. See Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions 
Under Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 399‒400 (2012); Wilkins & Reynolds, supra 
note 12, at 123; see, e.g., Shimon Shetreet, The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence 
in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International 
Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 275, 
275‒76, 278 (2009). 
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least partial causality when a nation reports that it has changed or will change its 
abortion laws in response to UN initiatives.20  This assumption leads to a 
methodology focused on agglomerating cases. 
I.  HOW THE UN ADVOCATES FOR PERMISSIVE ABORTION LAWS 
The point of departure for the recent global transformation of abortion laws 
was the 1994 adoption of the Programme of Action (PoA) of the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) by 179 States.21  The ICPD, 
which oversees a myriad of development issues, from economic growth to 
maternal mortality reduction, marked the first time that abortion was officially 
introduced and defined as a part of the UN agenda.22  Despite the emphasis on 
abortion throughout the text, many Member States worked to ensure that the 
document was crafted as much as possible to respect their sovereign authority to 
protect life.23 
The ICPD is a document of political will with no binding force; however, it is 
highly influential because it plays a primary role in the annual Commission on 
Population and Development (CPD) at UN Headquarters and in the follow-up 
review conferences every five years.24  Abortion activists have attempted to use 
the CPD to expand and redefine abortion and undermine States’ sovereign right 
to limit or outlaw abortion.25  However, the language of the ICPD is unequivocal.  
Although the document is replete with references to abortion, all references are 
subject to paragraph 8.25, which states: “In no case should abortion be promoted 
as a method of family planning . . . every attempt should be made to eliminate 
the need for abortion,” and “[a]ny measures or changes related to abortion . . . 
can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national 
legislative process.”26  Various Member States expressed reservations, thereby 
clarifying their national positions on abortion.27  Thus, the ICPD is a highly 
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., White, supra note 5. 
 21. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 at ch. I, 
§ 1, ¶ 8.19, ch. VI, §§ 5‒6, (1994). 
 22. Id. at ch. I, § 1, ¶ 8.19. 
 23. See generally id. (noting reservations regarding abortion from El Salvador, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Nicaragua, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, the Holy See, Malta, and Peru). 
 24. See generally Comm’n on Population & Dev. Res. 2014/1, U.N. Doc. E/2014/25-
E/CN.9/2014/7 (2014). 
 25. Pro-life and Family Member States Reject Outcome Document at UN Commission on 
Population and Development, ADF INT’L (Apr. 21, 2015), http://adfinternational.org/2015/04/21/ 
pro-life-and-family-member-states-reject-outcome-document-at-un-commission-on-population-
and-development/. 
 26. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. I, § 1, ¶ 8.25. 
 27. See Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., Programme of Action, 20th Anniversary 
Edition, 187‒88, 190‒92, 194‒201, 204‒05 (2014), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-
pdf/programme_of_action_Web%20ENGLISH.pdf (explaining that the delegations of Honduras, 
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nuanced document that underscores States’ sovereign prerogative to determine 
their own abortion laws. 
Many abortion activists ignore the qualifiers built into the ICPD designed to 
limit abortion and seek to promote the document, along with the subsequent 
1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as the preeminent guidebook 
on which countries should rely on liberalizing their abortion laws.28  For 
instance, the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR), a major abortion advocacy 
group, wrote in its 2014 briefing paper that at the ICPD, Member States 
“recognized that reproductive rights are human rights that are already enshrined 
in domestic and international law.”29  While this statement merely reiterates 
language in the ICPD,30 its meaning far exceeds the intention of the Member 
States that participated in the Conference because the CRR and its affiliate 
organizations insist that women have a “right to comprehensive reproductive 
health services, including abortion,” even in countries where abortion is illegal.31  
As a result of these erroneous interpretations, the ICPD has had a significant 
impact on the global development of abortion law, despite lacking the force of 
international law and incorporating very clear qualifiers that protect pro-life 
Member States.32 
Since the adoption of the ICPD, over thirty States have legalized, eased 
restrictions on, or expanded access to abortion.33  During that same time period, 
only eleven States—seven of which are European or Eurasian countries—have 
enacted restrictions on abortion.34  The trend, at least in the developing world, is 
toward liberalizing abortion law.35 
                                                 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and the Holy See all noted 
that they did not support “reproductive rights” if that term included abortion). 
 28. See supra notes 24‒27; U.N. Secretary-General, The Extent to Which Gender Concerns 
Have Been Included in the Activities of the United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, Annex I, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/9 (Aug. 21, 1995), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ 
N95/241/59/PDF/N9524159.pdf?OpenElement; see CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 
ABORTION WORLDWIDE: 20 YEARS OF REFORM 8, 9 (2014). 
 29. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 8. 
 30. See Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. VII, § 1, ¶ 
7.3 (“[R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national 
laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents.”). 
 31. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, BRINGING RIGHTS TO BEAR: ABORTION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2008). 
 32. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, ICPD AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 20 YEARS OF 
ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS THROUGH UN TREATY BODIES AND LEGAL REFORM Part 
III, 1‒2 (2013). 
 33. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, ABORTION WORLDWIDE, supra note 28, at 9. 
 34. Id. at 21, 25‒26, 31, 33 (listing Japan, Hungary, Russian Federation, Latvia, Slovak 
Republic, Germany, Macedonia, Belarus, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the United States at the state 
level as countries that have enacted restrictions on abortion). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 17 (noting that not a single African country has placed an additional 
restriction on abortion in the past twenty years). 
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The ICPD entrenched abortion in the official agenda of the UN.36  Since 1994, 
the UN has promoted permissive abortion laws in various ways.37  Prominent 
mechanisms include the consistent efforts of the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA), UN Women, and the World Health Organization (WHO).38 
WHO explicitly advocated for the liberalization of abortion laws in its 2012 
publication, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health 
Systems.39  According to WHO, “[t]he fulfillment of human rights requires that 
women can access safe abortion when it is indicated to protect their health,” and 
“[t]he protection of women from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
requires that those who have become pregnant as the result of coerced or forced 
sexual acts can lawfully access safe abortion services.”40  Moreover, WHO 
commends those nations that allow “abortion upon . . . request” for 
“recogniz[ing] the conditions for a woman’s free choice,” and cautions against 
laws or policies that “impose time limits on the length of pregnancy for which 
abortion can be performed.”41 
In particular, UNFPA urges that abortion be made accessible to adolescents, 
writing in a 2014 publication that “young people require a wide range of sexual 
and reproductive health services, including . . . safe abortion care,”42 and in 
another publication that “access to sexual and reproductive health services” is 
necessary to create conditions under which young people “can achieve their full 
potential.”43  The phrase “reproductive health services” is defined in the ICPD 
as including abortion in countries where abortion is legal.44 
UN Women argues there is a “right to choose” to procure an abortion, and that 
governments have a responsibility to assist low-income women in gaining 
access.45  Through UN Women, UNFPA, and WHO, the UN has advanced the 
perspective that there is an international right to abortion.46 
                                                 
 36. See Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, Population Div., Abortion Policies and Reproductive 
Health Around the World, at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/343 (2014), http://www.un.org/en/ 
development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/AbortionPoliciesReproductiveHealth.pdf. 
 37. Lauren Barbato, U.N. Declares Abortion Rights Are Human Rights, Promising To Support 
Reproductive Rights Worldwide, BUSTLE (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/52634-un 
-declares-abortion-rights-are-human-rights-promising-to-support-reproductive-rights-worldwide. 
 38. See infra notes 39‒46 and accompanying text.  Reviewing a sample of the pro-abortion 
efforts of these entities is illustrative, but a full review of such efforts would be cumbersome 
because there are so many examples. 
 39. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR 
HEALTH SYSTEMS 1‒2 (2d ed. 2012). 
 40. Id. at 92. 
 41. Id. at 93. 
 42. MONICA DAS GUPTA ET AL., THE POWER OF 1.8 BILLION: ADOLESCENTS, YOUTH AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FUTURE 37 (UNFPA ed., 2014). 
 43. UNFPA, ANNUAL REPORT 2014: A YEAR OF RENEWAL 7 (2014). 
 44. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. XIII, ¶ 13.14(b). 
 45. UN WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2015‒2016: TRANSFORMING 
ECONOMIES, REALIZING RIGHTS 162, 169‒70 (2015). 
 46. See supra notes 39‒45 and accompanying text. 
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The UN has also pushed repeatedly for more permissive abortion laws through 
TMBs.47  TMBs have called for abortion to be legalized in cases where 
pregnancy results from rape or incest48 and where the continued pregnancy 
would threaten the life49 or health50 of the mother.  TMBs have also 
recommended that in countries where abortion is legal, third-party authorization 
for abortion be removed,51 legal and policy frameworks be established to enable 
widespread access to abortion,52 and programs be developed to provide abortion 
services.53 
                                                 
 47. See infra notes 48‒54 and accompanying text. 
 48. Views of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Commc’n 
No. 22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, ¶ 9(b)(i), (iii), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (Nov. 4, 2011) 
[hereinafter “CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru”]; Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and 
Cultural Rights: Costa Rica, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CRI/CO/4/Corr.1 (Apr. 22, 2008) [hereinafter 
“CESCR: Costa Rica”]; Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Honduras, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HON/CO/6 (Aug. 10, 2007); Concluding 
Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Chile, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHL/CO/3 
(Apr. 23, 2007); Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: 
Monaco, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MCO/CO/1 (Jun. 13, 2006) [hereinafter “CESCR: Monaco”]; 
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Malta, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.101 (Dec. 14, 2004) [hereinafter “CESCR: Malta”]; Concluding Observations of the 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Chile, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Dec. 1, 
2004); Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Sri Lanka, ¶ 283, U.N. Doc. A/57/38, (Feb. 1, 2002); Concluding Observations of the Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Nepal, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Sept. 24, 2001); 
Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Colombia, ¶ 393, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter “CEDAW: Colombia”]. 
 49. CESCR: Costa Rica, supra note 48, ¶ 46; Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Brazil, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BRA/CO/6 
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Madagascar, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3 (May 11, 2007); Concluding Comments of the 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Nicaragua, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/NIC/CO/6 (Feb. 2, 2007); Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 
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of the Human Rights Comm.: Guatemala, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM (Aug. 27, 2001); 
Comment No. 28 of the Human Rights Comm. on the Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, 
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) [hereinafter “HRC Gen. Comment 
28”]; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Ecuador, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.92 (Aug. 18, 1998). 
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Although it would not be possible to comment on every occasion in which 
TMBs have recommended more permissive abortion laws, a few anecdotes 
capture the general logic and procedure of the pro-abortion agenda as carried out 
through TMBs.54  In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) recommended that Burkina Faso “review its 
legislation on abortion and provide for coverage by social security.”55  After the 
ICPD, Burkina Faso had already changed its abortion laws, ending its complete 
ban on abortion and allowing abortion to protect a woman’s health, in cases of 
rape and incest, and in cases where an unborn baby presents a fetal impairment.56  
However, these changes did not satisfy CEDAW.57  More recently, in 2014, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)—the Committee that monitors the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child—issued a report demanding that the Holy 
See change its position on abortion and recommending that “the Holy See 
undertake the necessary steps . . . to ensure that the Convention has precedence 
over internal laws and regulations.”58  Given that the Holy See is widely known 
to hold a specific religious perspective on abortion, the CRC report is quite 
bold.59 
The recent developments in Luxembourg discussed above illustrate the 
manner in which TMBs interact with the UPR to promote abortion.60  The UPR 
is a mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) that allows Member 
States to offer recommendations to one another regarding compliance with 
international human rights law.61  Several nations have been using the UPR to 
recommend that other nations modify their abortion laws.62  European countries 
                                                 
 54. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Comm. on the Rights of 
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 58. CRC: Holy See, supra note 54, ¶ 12. 
 59. See 1983 CODE c. 1398, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P57.HTM (stating 
that obtaining an abortion is grounds for excommunication from the Catholic Church). 
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 61. See Rep. of the Human Rights Council to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of 
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418 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:409 
made the vast majority of these recommendations, which are primarily directed 
at Latin American countries.63  Since the ICPD, the UN has developed a complex 
and potent system to advocate for permissive abortion laws, the effects of which 
come into focus upon consideration of the countries that have explicitly cited 
international treaties or TMB decisions when changing their abortion laws.64 
II.  THE IMPACT OF PRO-ABORTION INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES 
Although no international human rights treaty mentions abortion, these 
treaties have nevertheless been interpreted by several signatory nations to 
require legalized abortion.65  Generally, abortion advocates claim that a right to 
abortion is implied by rights addressed in a treaty—including the rights to health 
care, life, nondiscrimination, equality, security, liberty, privacy, and religion, as 
well as the rights to be free from cruel or inhuman treatment and to determine 
the number and spacing of one’s children.66  Such arguments typically describe 
the unborn child as a fetus, embryo, or simply a pregnancy.67  Abortion 
advocates then suggest reasons to conclude that the unborn child may be a threat 
to a mother’s enjoyment of her rights.68  These premises suggest that the mother 
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 64. See infra Parts II‒III. 
 65. See SAN JOSE ARTICLES, art. 5 (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.sanjosearticles.com/wp-
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on abortion is not binding on them.  See Ratification Table: Maputo Protocol, supra. 
 66. See generally International Human Rights Law and Abortion in Latin America, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (2005), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/wrd0106/wrd0106.pdf. 
 67. See, e.g., id. 
 68. See, e.g., Dhikta v. Nepal, (2009), writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007), *4 (Nepal), 
excerpts translated in Lakshmi Dhikta Case Summary and Translated Excerpts, REPROD. RTS., 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lakshmi%20Dhikta
%20-%20English%20translation.pdf. 
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has a right to protect herself by electing to prevent the child from being born.69  
This argument is granted legitimacy by the fact that the international human 
rights treaties are not specific about when life begins, whether at conception, 
birth, or some other point in time.70 
The influence of this type of reasoning is evident in a 2009 decision from the 
Supreme Court of Nepal.71  Prior to 2002, Nepal had a complete ban on 
abortion.72  In 2002, the Nepalese Government amended its laws to permit on-
demand abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.73  Overnight, Nepal 
went from having one of the most restrictive abortion laws to one of the most 
liberal.74  After this change, many Nepalese women still, in practice, lacked 
access to abortion.75 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Nepal in Dhikta v. Nepal76 ruled that the 
Nepalese Government needed to: (1) introduce a more comprehensive abortion 
law; (2) take measures to provide all Nepalese women access to abortion; and 
(3) fund all abortions for women who cannot afford the procedure.77  In its 
opinion, the court explained that Nepal’s prior law completely banning abortion 
was “inappropriate and unusual” from the “point of view of compliance with 
international norms.”78  Furthermore, the court stated that without the right to 
abortion, the “rights guaranteed to women under international treaties . . . would 
become unachievable.”79  The court cited U.S. Supreme Court and Austrian 
Constitutional Court cases for its determination that the unborn child cannot be 
deemed a legal person.80  Although no international law explicitly required 
Nepal to permit abortions, the Supreme Court of Nepal found this requirement 
to be implicit in international treaties.81  UN impact on this decision is visible 
                                                 
 69. See id. 
 70. See International Human Rights Law and Abortion in Latin America, supra note 66, at 9‒
10.  The American Convention on Human Rights, a regional treaty often referred to as the Pact of 
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Costa Rica’) (1969), art. 4, § 1, in SANDY GHANDHI, BLACKSTONE’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
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 71. Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) at *4. 
 72. S. Cohen, Nepal Reforms Abortion Law To Reduce Maternal Deaths, Promote Women’s 
Status, GUTTMACHER INST. (2002), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/2/gr050213.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) at *11. 
 76. (2009), writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) (Nepal). 
 77. Id. at *9‒13. 
 78. Id. at *4. 
 79. Id. at *7‒8. 
 80. Id. at *2. 
 81. See supra notes 78‒79 and accompanying text. 
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both in the cited influence of international treaties and the reference to 
“compliance with international norms.”82 
It is impossible, for the reasons already mentioned, to determine precisely 
whether these changes are more influenced by the UN or international norms.83  
Still, it is indisputable that prior to the Dhikta opinion, the UN functioned as a 
forum for advancing the kinds of ideas about treaty law that informed the 
Nepalese Supreme Court’s decision.84  It is hard to imagine that the Nepalese 
Supreme Court could have independently arrived at a reading of international 
law that is simultaneously so far divorced from the actual content of the relevant 
treaties, and so close to the interpretation for which the UN has energetically 
advocated.85 
A 1991 ruling by the Belgian Court of Arbitration evinced a similar 
reasoning.86  In 1997, Belgium submitted its periodic report to the HRC, wherein 
it detailed its compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).87  In detailing its compliance with Article 23 of the ICCPR, the 
Belgian Government explained that in an effort to take “appropriate steps to 
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage during 
the marriage,” the Belgian Court of Arbitration ruled that husbands do not have 
a right to be consulted in a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion.88  This 
decision made abortions more easily accessible for some women.89  In its 
reasoning, the Belgian Court cited Article 23 of the ICCPR when stating, “even 
a broad interpretation of article 23 of the Covenant does not make it possible to 
include therein procedural rights such as those that would derive from the right 
of the husband to be consulted.”90 
The Nepalese and Belgian cases are examples of when national judiciaries 
have explicitly grounded their decisions about abortion law in a specific 
interpretation of international law advanced by powerful forces within the UN.91  
                                                 
 82. See supra notes 78‒79 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra notes 9‒20 and accompanying text. 
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With regard to abortion laws, UN interpretation of international treaties has 
become increasingly influential, while the influence of the actual text of treaties 
has correspondingly diminished.92  The UN is successfully holding nations 
responsible, not to the negotiated text of international treaties, but to the 
normative positions of various UN organs and bodies.93 
The UN’s revisionist interpretation of treaties has also had an impact on how 
national legislatures confront abortion.94  Ethiopia stated that it changed abortion 
laws to comply with international treaties.95  In 2005, Ethiopia amended its penal 
code to allow abortion up through twenty-eight weeks gestation96 when a 
woman’s health or life is at risk, as well as in cases of rape, incest, fetal 
impairment, when the pregnant person is a minor, or where the woman has a 
physical or psychological disability or injury.97  Prior to this amendment, 
abortion had been illegal unless performed to preserve the health or life of the 
pregnant woman or, in certain circumstances, in response to conditions of 
extreme poverty.98  The amended law went into effect in 2005, and shortly 
thereafter, the Ethiopian Government implemented a document entitled 
Technical and Procedural Guideline for Safe Abortion Services.99  In this 
document, the Government detailed that it partially expanded its abortion law to 
comply with international law.100  The document states: 
Ethiopia has ratified international human rights conventions and 
treaties that are legally binding and that form international law.  The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which provides the foundation for 
reproductive rights, is one such notable convention. The Tehran 
Proclamation, the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD), the Fourth World Congress on Women, and the 
2000 United Nations (UN) Summit are some of the major forums at 
which national governments have expressed their commitment to 
improving the status of women in society.  These and other 
international initiatives have yielded wider recognition of individuals’ 
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rights to lead safe and responsible reproductive lives and have 
underscored the responsibility of governments to not only respect 
those rights but also to create the legal and policy environment for 
their realization.101 
The Government explained its decision to expand abortion access in terms of its 
recognition of reproductive rights as discussed in several UN documents and 
conferences.102  According to the Ethiopian Government, the influence of UN 
treaties was significant in providing it with the impetus to change its laws.103  
The Ethiopian Government added: 
At the UN summit in 2000, governments of the world ratified the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an international tool for 
reducing poverty and improving the standard of living in the 
developing world.  One of the eight MDGs is to reduce the maternal 
mortality rate by 75% (from 1990 levels) by the year 2015.  Preventing 
unsafe abortion is one of the five strategies for reducing maternal 
mortality that was endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
in 2004. 
In response to these developments at the global level and changes in 
social and gender relations within the country, the government of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has reviewed its 
laws and policies within the last decade.104 
As the Government reports, Ethiopia’s interpretation of international treaties 
was shaped by non-binding recommendations from WHO and discussions at 
several UN conferences.105 
Chile may join Ethiopia in reaching the conclusion that international law 
requires the recognition of a right to abortion.106  Currently, Chile’s law imposes 
a total ban on abortion.107  Yet, in January 2015, President Michelle Bachelet—
the former head of UN Women—sent a proposal to the Chilean Congress to 
legalize abortion.108  The law would allow abortions through the twelfth week 
of pregnancy when the mother’s life is deemed at risk, in cases of rape, or when 
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the fetus is deformed and will not survive.109  In defending her proposal, 
Bachelet claimed that Chile’s laws constitute a breach of international 
obligations.110  This is a case where one of the bureaucrats responsible for 
developing pro-abortion soft law at the UN attempts to persuade her nation of 
the legitimacy of her reading of international law.111  Observing whether she 
succeeds will provide intriguing data about the influence of UN treaties and UN 
interpretations of treaty law on national abortion law. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF ABORTION ADVOCACY BY TMBS 
TMBs’ actions have played a major role in causing treaties that do not mention 
abortion to become associated with a purported right to abortion.112  Each 
international treaty that deals with human rights has been assigned a treaty 
monitoring body, which is a committee made up of independent experts.113  The 
function of a TMB is to monitor signatory States’ compliance with the treaty in 
question.114  TMBs carry out this function by offering recommendations in 
response to the required periodic reports submitted by signatory nations and by 
issuing quasi-judicial decisions in response to claims brought by individuals 
against signatory nations.115  Recently, TMBs frequently have claimed that 
nations with restrictive abortion laws are not in compliance with international 
treaties, notwithstanding the fact that those treaties do not mention abortion.116  
TMBs have become a powerful mechanism for advancing the view that a 
commitment to internationally recognized human rights requires permissive 
abortion laws.117 
Recent developments in Bolivia demonstrate the effectiveness of TMBs in 
influencing national abortion laws.118  Bolivia’s abortion law permits abortion 
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when a woman’s life, physical health, or mental health are deemed impaired by 
the pregnancy, as well as in cases of rape or incest.119  However, the law 
originally required women to receive judicial authorization prior to the 
abortion.120  In 2014, Bolivia’s Constitutional Court invalidated this 
requirement.121  In justifying its decision, the court relied heavily on TMB 
interpretations of international law.122  It specifically noted the recommendations 
of the HRC,123 the Committee Against Torture (CAT), and CEDAW, to which 
CAT instructed Bolivia to refer.124  While factors other than the influence of 
these TMBs were presumably relevant, the sequence of events—restrictive 
abortion law, recommendation from the TMBs, and changed abortion law that 
uses reasoning explicitly based on the TMBs’ recommendation—is a telling 
testimony to the influence that bureaucratic entities tasked with monitoring an 
international treaty have over domestic law.125 
Chad, like Bolivia, amended its abortion legislation in response to a TMB 
recommendation.126  In 1997, Chad prepared its initial periodic report to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), detailing the ways in which it had 
been complying with the treaty.127  In 1999, the CRC reviewed Chad’s report 
and issued concluding observations regarding Chad’s compliance.128  In those 
observations, the CRC asked Chad to review its legislation prohibiting abortion 
and to undertake studies “to understand . . . the negative impact of . . . illegal 
abortion.”129  Less than three years later, in 2002, Chad greatly relaxed 
restrictions on abortions, broadly expanding the instances in which abortions 
                                                 
 119. Aborto Impune [Unpunished Abortion], Bolivia Código Penal, art. 266 (Bol.), http:// 
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may be performed legally.130  In its periodic report covering 1999‒2006,131 Chad 
described its decision to change its abortion laws as follows: “In response to the 
Committee’s concluding observations . . . the Government adopted a series of 
measures . . . on the promotion of reproductive health.”132 
Colombia provides another example of heavy judicial reliance on TMB 
recommendations.133  Before 2006, abortion was completely illegal in 
Colombia.134  In 2006, the Colombian Constitutional Court legalized abortion, 
without specification as to gestational limit, when (1) the pregnancy threatens 
the woman’s health or life; (2) the fetus is deemed to have malformations 
incompatible with life; or (3) the pregnancy is the result of another’s criminal 
acts such as rape, incest, or artificial insemination without the woman’s 
consent.135  In explaining its decision, the court pointed to the non-binding 
recommendations of several TMBs.136  In fact, the court’s opinion lists every 
TMB recommendation about abortion, starting with recommendations from the 
HRC under the ICCPR,137 CEDAW,138 CRC,139 Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD),140 and CAT.141  The examples of Bolivia, 
Chad, and Colombia demonstrate the influence of TMB recommendations on 
abortion laws. 
TMBs also have influenced abortion laws through the exercise of their quasi-
judicial functions.  A recent decision of the National Supreme Court of 
Argentina demonstrates the impact that TMBs’ quasi-judicial functions can have 
on domestic abortion laws.142  In 2012, the court adopted a novel interpretation 
of Argentina’s penal code, holding that the code allowed abortion in all rape 
cases.143  Previously, only women with mental disabilities were explicitly 
permitted to obtain abortions in cases of rape.144  In its decision, the court stated 
its concern that failure to broaden permissive abortions might compromise 
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Argentina’s responsibility to the international legal system in light of the fact 
that international bodies had censured several nations for their restrictive 
abortion laws.145  The year before this decision, Argentina itself had been 
criticized by the HRC in LMR v. Argentina (also known as VDA v. Argentina),146 
for not ensuring access to legal abortion for a mentally impaired woman who 
sought an abortion after a suspected rape by her uncle.147  The Supreme Court 
of Argentina ordered the performance of the abortion, but no hospital would 
carry it out, and the woman was forced to seek an illegal abortion.148  When the 
case was brought to the HRC, the Committee stated that, by not ensuring access 
to a legal abortion, Argentina had violated the woman’s right to privacy and right 
not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.149  This case 
provides another example of the understanding that access to abortion is 
guaranteed by other unrelated rights.150  Indeed, according to LMR’s 
representatives, Argentina had violated the woman’s rights to life, equal 
treatment, and freedom of thought and conscience.151 
Twisting the text of international treaties in this manner violates the standard 
practices of treaty interpretation.152  Nevertheless, this practice has become 
widespread among the bureaucrats responsible for monitoring treaty compliance 
and through the influence of TMBs, and has contributed to the liberalization of 
domestic abortion laws.153 
Quasi-judicial TMB functions have also seemingly contributed to 
developments in abortion policy in Peru, but here the efficacy of TMBs in 
influencing change is less clear.154  Since 1924, the only legal form of abortion 
in Peru has been therapeutic abortion.155  Abortion can be performed only when 
necessary to save the life of, or prevent serious and permanent damage to, the 
pregnant woman.156  When it signed the ICPD, Peru made a reservation stating 
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that life begins at conception.157  In recent years, TMBs have put significant 
pressure on Peru to make changes in its abortion laws and policies.158  In 
particular, two cases—K.L. v. Peru159 and L.C. v. Peru160—have been brought 
before the HRC and CEDAW, respectively.161  In K.L. v. Peru, the HRC 
determined that Peru had violated several articles of the ICCPR by refusing to 
authorize the abortion of an anencephalic baby.162  In L.C. v. Peru, CEDAW 
ruled that Peru had violated several articles of CEDAW by not ensuring that a 
woman impregnated from rape received an abortion to allow the timely 
performance of a surgery she needed to prevent severe spinal cord injuries.163 
In these decisions, the HRC and CEDAW made several recommendations, 
including that Peru establish a mechanism to ensure the rapid availability of 
abortion services in cases where a mother’s life or health is severely threatened, 
and amend its law to permit abortions in cases of rape.164  Recently, Peru has 
followed the first of these recommendations, offering national guidelines for the 
provision of abortion services.165  These guidelines lay out eleven circumstances 
in which the threat to the mother’s life created by a pregnancy is considered 
grave enough to warrant abortion, and they establish a procedure for determining 
in a timely fashion whether abortion is permissible.166  However, rape is still not 
considered a sufficient justification for abortion.167 
While Peru has partially resisted TMB pressure, it standardized the procedure 
for obtaining abortions.168  It is possible that this standardization will lead to an 
increasing number of abortions in Peru.  Either way, TMB decisions have 
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already contributed to significant changes in the way Peru handles abortion 
policy.169 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If one finds trustworthy political actors’ reports of their own motives, then it 
is clear that various UN bodies—rather than the actual UN Member States—
have influenced abortion law transformations.170  In the past, Member States 
have been more or less in control of UN processes, with the result that negotiated 
international treaties do not lean toward controversial positions.  In recent years, 
however, internal UN actors have gained more influence and begun to use the 
UN to advance a specific agenda.171  Since the ICPD, the UN has developed a 
multifaceted system for advocating for permissive abortion laws.172  UN entities, 
such as UN Women, UNFPA, and WHO, advance the position that access to 
abortion is a right held by all women.  TMBs pressure countries to change their 
abortion laws through concluding comments and quasi-judicial decisions.  The 
UPR provides pro-abortion countries a forum in which they can join UN efforts 
to pressure countries with less permissive abortion laws.  This system has led 
countries to interpret treaties ostensibly unrelated to abortion as requiring the 
allowance or promotion of abortion.  In this international legal climate, it has 
become less important that treaty law says nothing about national abortion 
policies.  International soft law has grown in influence, at least in relation to this 
aspect of national law, and has played a role in reshaping domestic abortion laws. 
 
                                                 
 169. See, e.g., id. 
 170. See, e.g., supra notes 78‒79, 123‒24, 129 and accompanying text. 
 171. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 39, at 88‒90. 
 172. Id. 
